Discussion:
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
(too old to reply)
Halcitron
2004-05-02 01:10:33 UTC
Permalink
(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for a
system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a crime
and why?)

TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
Issue of 2004-05-10
Posted 2004-04-30

In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one
of the world’s most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and
vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women—no accurate
count is possible—were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in
twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.

In the looting that followed the regime’s collapse, last April, the huge
prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be
removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had
the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new
medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the
prisoners, however—by the fall there were several thousand, including women
and teen-agers—were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random
military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely
defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of “crimes
against the coalition”; and a small number of suspected “high-value”
leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.

Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named
commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military
prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone,
was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the
Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system.
Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four
hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling
prisoners.

General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a
business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job.
In an interview last December with the St. Petersburg Times, she said that, for
many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, “living conditions now are better in
prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn’t want
to leave.”

A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended,
and a major investigation into the Army’s prison system, authorized by
Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under
way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by The New Yorker, written by Major
General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in
late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army
prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October
and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of “sadistic, blatant, and
wanton criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of
detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military
Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community.
(The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to
Karpinski’s brigade headquarters.) Taguba’s report listed some of the
wrongdoing:

Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle
and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police
guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually
biting a detainee.


There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba
added—“detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic
photographic evidence.” Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the
abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of
their “extremely sensitive nature.”

The photographs—several of which were broadcast on CBS’s “60 Minutes 2”
last week—show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to
assume humiliating poses. Six suspects—Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II,
known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner;
Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and
Private Jeremy Sivits—are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that
include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners,
maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie
England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.

The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from
her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a
young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he
masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands
reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his
sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are
grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked
Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is
another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid.
Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in
front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another
cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking
photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male
prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear
that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and
hooded.

Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in
the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating
for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of
Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. “Being put on top
of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each
other—it’s all a form of torture,” Haykel said.

Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There
is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another
prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an
empty room, splattered with blood.

The 372nd’s abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine—a fact of Army life
that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing
(the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant
Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist
Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other
soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called “hard
site” at Abu Ghraib—seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were
considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting
a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:

SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think
it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL
Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick
hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no
danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.


When he returned later, Wisdom testified:

I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth
open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right .
. . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, “Look what these
animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.” I heard PFC England
shout out, “He’s getting hard.”


Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that
“the issue was taken care of.” He said, “I just didn’t want to be part
of anything that looked criminal.”


The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby,
an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip
Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of
the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court,
according to an abridged transcript made available to me, “The investigation
started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across
pictures of naked detainees.” Bobeck said that Darby had “initially put an
anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn
statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.”

Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his
colleagues had not been given any “training guidelines” that he was aware
of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police
duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003,
the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at
thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he
had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of
Corrections. Bobeck explained:

What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in
charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things
were supposed to be run.


Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion,
“had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went
into cardiac arrest.”

At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys,
Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two
dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of
Frederick’s co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after
exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away
from the courtroom. “The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage
witnesses and discover facts,” Gary Myers told me. “We ended up with a
c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine.” After the hearing, the
presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to
convene a court-martial against Frederick.

Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions
of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client’s defense will be that he
was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions
of military intelligence. He said, “Do you really think a group of kids from
rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to
embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?”

In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the
military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and
interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant
force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:

I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates
in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the
door of their cell—and the answer I got was, “This is how military
intelligence (MI) wants it done.” . . . . MI has also instructed us to place
a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running
water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.


The military-intelligence officers have “encouraged and told us, ‘Great
job,’ they were now getting positive results and information,” Frederick
wrote. “CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to
intimidate prisoners at MI’s request.” At one point, Frederick told his
family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry
Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the
mistreatment of prisoners. “His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’”

In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the
Abu Ghraib guards called “O.G.A.,” or other government agencies—that is,
the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees—was brought to his unit for
questioning. “They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put
his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four
hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a
stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away.” The dead Iraqi was
never entered into the prison’s inmate-control system, Frederick recounted,
“and therefore never had a number.”

Frederick’s defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in
his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army
reports—Taguba’s and one by the Army’s chief law-enforcement officer,
Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.

Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq
and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder’s report, filed on November 5th,
concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower
issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious
concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned
to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate
them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive
collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.

There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said,
that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to “set favorable
conditions for subsequent interviews”—a euphemism for breaking the will of
prisoners. “Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a
detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and
docile state.” General Karpinski’s brigade, Ryder reported, “has not been
directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI
interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.” Ryder called for
the establishment of procedures to “define the role of military police
soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the
military intelligence personnel.” The officers running the war in Iraq were
put on notice.

Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not
yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he
found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement
practices.” His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup.

Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general.
“Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during
[Ryder’s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this
investigation,” he wrote. “In fact, many of the abuses suffered by
detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.” The
report continued, “Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s report, I find
that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed
to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI
interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private
contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental
conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.”

Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army
C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s,
testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded
prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and
penis. She stated, “MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and
Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”

Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told
C.I.D. investigators, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . .
being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were
told that they had different rules.” Taguba wrote, “Davis also stated that
he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what
MI said he stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us.’‘Make sure he has a bad
night.’‘Make sure he gets the treatment.’” Military intelligence made
these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. “The MI staffs to my
understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like,
‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question.
They’re giving out good information.’”

When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant
Davis answered, “Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the
ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the
wing”—where the abuse took place—“belongs to MI and it appeared MI
personnel approved of the abuse.”

Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing,
said, “I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses,
sheets, and clothes.” (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to
do this “they needed to give me paperwork.”) Taguba also cited an interview
with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian
contractor. He told of one night when a “bunch of people from MI” watched
as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner
and Frederick.

General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers
and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the
commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial
punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of
the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and
reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz,
of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his
security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or
ordering military policemen “who were not trained in interrogation techniques
to facilitate interrogations by ‘setting conditions’ which were neither
authorized” nor in accordance with Army regulations. “He clearly knew his
instructions equated to physical abuse,” Taguba wrote. He also recommended
disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman
for CACI said that the company had “received no formal communication” from
the Army about the matter.)

“I suspect,” Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and
Israel “were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu
Ghraib,” and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.


The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior
commanders. During Karpinski’s seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there
were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes,
attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by
officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the
killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of
“lessons learned” inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably
approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day
procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to
insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, “cases of
abuse may have been prevented.”

General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and
that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources.
“This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and
accountability lapses,” he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said,
between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially
recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were
wrongly being detained—indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba
study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib
were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be
released. Karpinski’s defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers
“routinely” rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such
prisoners.

Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba
wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some
that he considered “without precedent in my military career.” The soldiers,
he added, were “poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at
the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission.”

General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he
described as extremely emotional: “What I found particularly disturbing in
her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept
that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or
exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish
and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers.”

Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers
and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal
proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and
the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.


After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major
General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived
in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay
detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into
possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.

As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush,
insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military
as a whole. Taguba’s report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of
collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels.
The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the
Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day
management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units
and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting
intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.

The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American
intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a
C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is
invariably counterproductive. “They’ll tell you what you want to hear,
truth or no truth,” Rowell said. “‘You can flog me until I tell you what
I know you want me to say.’ You don’t get righteous information.”

Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who
pose an “imperative” security threat, but it must establish a regular
procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat
be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision
and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after
month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect,
another Guantánamo.

As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had
enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had
nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and
for the United States’ reputation in the world.

Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick’s military attorney, closed his defense at
the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was “attempting to
have these six soldiers atone for its sins.” Similarly, Gary Myers,
Frederick’s civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the
court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client.
“I’m going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian
contractor I can find into court,” he said. “Do you really believe the Army
relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance.”

http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact




http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact



caveat lector

Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.

Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
Ignoramus26050
2004-05-02 02:22:00 UTC
Permalink
As I said before, abuse of prisoners was partof guards' job
description.

They were rewarded based on how much the inmates were "softened".

Gunner, could you please apologize to me and acknowledge that I was
right.

i
Post by Halcitron
(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for a
system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a crime
and why?)
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
Issue of 2004-05-10
Posted 2004-04-30
In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one
of the world?s most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and
vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women?no accurate
count is possible?were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in
twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.
In the looting that followed the regime?s collapse, last April, the huge
prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be
removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had
the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new
medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the
prisoners, however?by the fall there were several thousand, including women
and teen-agers?were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random
military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely
defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of ?crimes
against the coalition?; and a small number of suspected ?high-value?
leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.
Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named
commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military
prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone,
was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the
Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system.
Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four
hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling
prisoners.
General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a
business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job.
In an interview last December with the St. Petersburg Times, she said that, for
many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, ?living conditions now are better in
prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn?t want
to leave.?
A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended,
and a major investigation into the Army?s prison system, authorized by
Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under
way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by The New Yorker, written by Major
General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in
late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army
prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October
and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of ?sadistic, blatant, and
wanton criminal abuses? at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of
detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military
Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community.
(The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to
Karpinski?s brigade headquarters.) Taguba?s report listed some of the
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle
and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police
guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually
biting a detainee.
There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba
added??detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic
photographic evidence.? Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the
abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of
their ?extremely sensitive nature.?
The photographs?several of which were broadcast on CBS?s ?60 Minutes 2?
last week?show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to
assume humiliating poses. Six suspects?Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II,
known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner;
Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and
Private Jeremy Sivits?are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that
include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners,
maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie
England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.
The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from
her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a
young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he
masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands
reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his
sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are
grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked
Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is
another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid.
Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in
front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another
cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking
photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male
prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear
that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and
hooded.
Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in
the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating
for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of
Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. ?Being put on top
of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each
other?it?s all a form of torture,? Haykel said.
Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There
is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another
prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an
empty room, splattered with blood.
The 372nd?s abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine?a fact of Army life
that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing
(the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant
Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist
Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other
soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called ?hard
site? at Abu Ghraib?seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were
considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting
SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think
it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL
Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick
hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no
danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.
I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth
open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn?t think it was right .
. . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, ?Look what these
animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.? I heard PFC England
shout out, ?He?s getting hard.?
Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that
?the issue was taken care of.? He said, ?I just didn?t want to be part
of anything that looked criminal.?
The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby,
an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip
Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of
the Army?s Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court,
according to an abridged transcript made available to me, ?The investigation
started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across
pictures of naked detainees.? Bobeck said that Darby had ?initially put an
anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn
statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.?
Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his
colleagues had not been given any ?training guidelines? that he was aware
of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police
duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003,
the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at
thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he
had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of
What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in
charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things
were supposed to be run.
Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion,
?had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went
into cardiac arrest.?
At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys,
Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two
dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of
Frederick?s co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after
exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away
from the courtroom. ?The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage
witnesses and discover facts,? Gary Myers told me. ?We ended up with a
c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine.? After the hearing, the
presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to
convene a court-martial against Frederick.
Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions
of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client?s defense will be that he
was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions
of military intelligence. He said, ?Do you really think a group of kids from
rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to
embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude??
In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the
military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and
interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant
I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates
in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the
door of their cell?and the answer I got was, ?This is how military
intelligence (MI) wants it done.? . . . . MI has also instructed us to place
a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running
water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.
The military-intelligence officers have ?encouraged and told us, ?Great
job,? they were now getting positive results and information,? Frederick
wrote. ?CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to
intimidate prisoners at MI?s request.? At one point, Frederick told his
family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry
Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the
mistreatment of prisoners. ?His reply was ?Don?t worry about it.??
In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the
Abu Ghraib guards called ?O.G.A.,? or other government agencies?that is,
the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees?was brought to his unit for
questioning. ?They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put
his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four
hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a
stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away.? The dead Iraqi was
never entered into the prison?s inmate-control system, Frederick recounted,
?and therefore never had a number.?
Frederick?s defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in
his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army
reports?Taguba?s and one by the Army?s chief law-enforcement officer,
Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.
Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq
and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder?s report, filed on November 5th,
concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower
issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious
concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned
to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate
them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive
collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.
There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said,
that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to ?set favorable
conditions for subsequent interviews??a euphemism for breaking the will of
prisoners. ?Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a
detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and
docile state.? General Karpinski?s brigade, Ryder reported, ?has not been
directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI
interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.? Ryder called for
the establishment of procedures to ?define the role of military police
soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the
military intelligence personnel.? The officers running the war in Iraq were
put on notice.
Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not
yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he
found ?no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement
practices.? His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup.
Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general.
?Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during
[Ryder?s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this
investigation,? he wrote. ?In fact, many of the abuses suffered by
detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.? The
report continued, ?Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder?s report, I find
that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed
to change facility procedures to ?set the conditions? for MI
interrogations.? Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private
contractors ?actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental
conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.?
Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army
C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s,
testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded
prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and
penis. She stated, ?MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and
Frederick?s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.?
Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told
C.I.D. investigators, ?I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . .
being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were
told that they had different rules.? Taguba wrote, ?Davis also stated that
he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what
MI said he stated: ?Loosen this guy up for us.??Make sure he has a bad
night.??Make sure he gets the treatment.?? Military intelligence made
these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. ?The MI staffs to my
understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like,
?Good job, they?re breaking down real fast. They answer every question.
They?re giving out good information.??
When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant
Davis answered, ?Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the
ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the
wing??where the abuse took place??belongs to MI and it appeared MI
personnel approved of the abuse.?
Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing,
said, ?I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses,
sheets, and clothes.? (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to
do this ?they needed to give me paperwork.?) Taguba also cited an interview
with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian
contractor. He told of one night when a ?bunch of people from MI? watched
as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner
and Frederick.
General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers
and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the
commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial
punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of
the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and
reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz,
of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his
security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or
ordering military policemen ?who were not trained in interrogation techniques
to facilitate interrogations by ?setting conditions? which were neither
authorized? nor in accordance with Army regulations. ?He clearly knew his
instructions equated to physical abuse,? Taguba wrote. He also recommended
disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman
for CACI said that the company had ?received no formal communication? from
the Army about the matter.)
?I suspect,? Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and
Israel ?were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu
Ghraib,? and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.
The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior
commanders. During Karpinski?s seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there
were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes,
attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by
officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the
killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of
?lessons learned? inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably
approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day
procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to
insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, ?cases of
abuse may have been prevented.?
General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and
that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources.
?This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and
accountability lapses,? he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said,
between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially
recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were
wrongly being detained?indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba
study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib
were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be
released. Karpinski?s defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers
?routinely? rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such
prisoners.
Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba
wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some
that he considered ?without precedent in my military career.? The soldiers,
he added, were ?poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at
the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission.?
General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he
described as extremely emotional: ?What I found particularly disturbing in
her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept
that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or
exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish
and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers.?
Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers
and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal
proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and
the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.
After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major
General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived
in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay
detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into
possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.
As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush,
insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military
as a whole. Taguba?s report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of
collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels.
The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the
Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day
management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units
and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting
intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.
The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American
intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a
C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is
invariably counterproductive. ?They?ll tell you what you want to hear,
truth or no truth,? Rowell said. ??You can flog me until I tell you what
I know you want me to say.? You don?t get righteous information.?
Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who
pose an ?imperative? security threat, but it must establish a regular
procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat
be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision
and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after
month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect,
another Guantánamo.
As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had
enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had
nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and
for the United States? reputation in the world.
Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick?s military attorney, closed his defense at
the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was ?attempting to
have these six soldiers atone for its sins.? Similarly, Gary Myers,
Frederick?s civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the
court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client.
?I?m going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian
contractor I can find into court,? he said. ?Do you really believe the Army
relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance.?
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact
caveat lector
Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.
Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ @ @ Please forgive my typos as my right hand is injured. @ @ @
char*p="char*p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
"It's never too late to have a happy childhood."
Halcitron
2004-05-02 03:11:34 UTC
Permalink
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
Date: 2 May 2004 02:22:00 GMT
As I said before, abuse of prisoners was partof guards' job
description.
You are a liar. Their job description, is a writtent document in their Training
Record, signed by themself and their supervisor and Department Head.
They were rewarded based on how much the inmates were "softened".
You are a victim of your own ignorance. They were mislead, by the hierarchy of
officers and civilians, allowed to have access to the prisoners. If MI wanted
to have aprisoner softened, then they should have had the prisoner brought to
them for softenting - not pre-softened. If MI wante dto keep a prisoner up all
night, then they should have been the ones doing it.

Only those persons deemed needing such treatment should have been kept in
prison, all others hould have be returned home.

There should be established a system of records for tracking the prisoners
throughout the prison, recording names, numbers, dates, times, and signatures,
just as a kilo of heroin moves through a police station, and a chain of
custody, keeps the record.

Lack of this and other protocols, lead to this incident making the headlines.
Gunner, could you please apologize to me and acknowledge that I was
right.
Your are FUCKED!

:|



caveat lector

Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.

Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
Ignoramus26050
2004-05-02 03:37:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Halcitron
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
Date: 2 May 2004 02:22:00 GMT
As I said before, abuse of prisoners was partof guards' job
description.
You are a liar. Their job description, is a writtent document in their Training
Record, signed by themself and their supervisor and Department Head.
They were rewarded based on how much the inmates were "softened".
You are a victim of your own ignorance. They were mislead, by the hierarchy of
officers and civilians, allowed to have access to the prisoners. If MI wanted
to have aprisoner softened, then they should have had the prisoner brought to
them for softenting - not pre-softened. If MI wante dto keep a prisoner up all
night, then they should have been the ones doing it.
Only those persons deemed needing such treatment should have been kept in
prison, all others hould have be returned home.
There should be established a system of records for tracking the prisoners
throughout the prison, recording names, numbers, dates, times, and signatures,
just as a kilo of heroin moves through a police station, and a chain of
custody, keeps the record.
Lack of this and other protocols, lead to this incident making the headlines.
All kinds of lofty things "should" be happening, but what was actually
happening was what I described (based on news articles).

i
Post by Halcitron
Gunner, could you please apologize to me and acknowledge that I was
right.
Your are FUCKED!
:|
caveat lector
Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.
Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ @ @ Please forgive my typos as my right hand is injured. @ @ @
char*p="char*p=%c%s%c;main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}";main(){printf(p,34,p,34);}
"It's never too late to have a happy childhood."
Strabo
2004-05-03 23:29:14 UTC
Permalink
Post by Halcitron
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
Date: 2 May 2004 02:22:00 GMT
As I said before, abuse of prisoners was partof guards' job
description.
You are a liar. Their job description, is a writtent document in their Training
Record, signed by themself and their supervisor and Department Head.
They were rewarded based on how much the inmates were "softened".
You are a victim of your own ignorance. They were mislead, by the hierarchy of
officers and civilians, allowed to have access to the prisoners. If MI wanted
to have aprisoner softened, then they should have had the prisoner brought to
them for softenting - not pre-softened. If MI wante dto keep a prisoner up all
night, then they should have been the ones doing it.
Only those persons deemed needing such treatment should have been kept in
prison, all others hould have be returned home.
There should be established a system of records for tracking the prisoners
throughout the prison, recording names, numbers, dates, times, and signatures,
just as a kilo of heroin moves through a police station, and a chain of
custody, keeps the record.
Lack of this and other protocols, lead to this incident making the headlines.
This is a very serious situation. Because of the cavalier and
off handed manner in which these people took pictures of each
other and openly carried through with obviously illegal acts,
there is every reason to believe that they represent the tip
of an iceberg.

From this group will come our police and prison guards, our
teachers, politicians and future parents.

You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
blame the individuals.

The only things lacking here were morals and values.
Post by Halcitron
Gunner, could you please apologize to me and acknowledge that I was
right.
Your are FUCKED!
:|
caveat lector
Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.
Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
R. David Steele
2004-05-04 04:23:27 UTC
Permalink
|>>Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
|>>Date: 2 May 2004 02:22:00 GMT
|
|>>As I said before, abuse of prisoners was partof guards' job
|>>description.
|>
|>You are a liar. Their job description, is a writtent document in their Training
|>Record, signed by themself and their supervisor and Department Head.
|>
|>>They were rewarded based on how much the inmates were "softened".
|>
|>You are a victim of your own ignorance. They were mislead, by the hierarchy of
|>officers and civilians, allowed to have access to the prisoners. If MI wanted
|>to have aprisoner softened, then they should have had the prisoner brought to
|>them for softenting - not pre-softened. If MI wante dto keep a prisoner up all
|>night, then they should have been the ones doing it.
|>
|>Only those persons deemed needing such treatment should have been kept in
|>prison, all others hould have be returned home.
|>
|>There should be established a system of records for tracking the prisoners
|>throughout the prison, recording names, numbers, dates, times, and signatures,
|>just as a kilo of heroin moves through a police station, and a chain of
|>custody, keeps the record.
|>
|>Lack of this and other protocols, lead to this incident making the headlines.
|
|This is a very serious situation. Because of the cavalier and
|off handed manner in which these people took pictures of each
|other and openly carried through with obviously illegal acts,
|there is every reason to believe that they represent the tip
|of an iceberg.
|
|From this group will come our police and prison guards, our
|teachers, politicians and future parents.
|
|You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
|orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
|that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
|blame the individuals.
|
|The only things lacking here were morals and values.

1) there are few people in the US who have morals and values.
Especially those from the upper East Coast. God is not high on
their list.

2) These folks in the 800th MP Bde are National Guard. Most of
them are either police officers or prison guards. One of the
folks facing court martial is a federal prison guard.
Duck Dog
2004-05-04 11:00:33 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 04 May 2004 04:23:27 GMT, R. David Steele
Post by R. David Steele
1) there are few people in the US who have morals and values.
Especially those from the upper East Coast. God is not high on
their list.
What exactly does god have to do with morals and values?
Post by R. David Steele
2) These folks in the 800th MP Bde are National Guard. Most of
them are either police officers or prison guards. One of the
folks facing court martial is a federal prison guard.
R. David Steele
2004-05-05 11:43:51 UTC
Permalink
|>1) there are few people in the US who have morals and values.
|>Especially those from the upper East Coast. God is not high on
|>their list.
|
|What exactly does god have to do with morals and values?

Morality stems from religion. Ethics is the secular version.
Both are externally forced on you. A society like ours that
places the individual above all then says that what only is
important is that which the individual values, not what is best
for all.

Post Modernism, which is taught at most universities, says that
there is no reality except the one that you create. Thus no
external value system.

Thus we are an amoral, if not immoral, society. Which is one
reason that those in Islam, which is a heavily handed religion
far to the right of anything here in the US, hates us.

|>2) These folks in the 800th MP Bde are National Guard. Most of
|>them are either police officers or prison guards. One of the
|>folks facing court martial is a federal prison guard.
|>
Duck Dog
2004-05-05 18:01:51 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, 05 May 2004 11:43:51 GMT, R. David Steele
Post by R. David Steele
|>1) there are few people in the US who have morals and values.
|>Especially those from the upper East Coast. God is not high on
|>their list.
|
|What exactly does god have to do with morals and values?
Morality stems from religion.
The heck it does.
Post by R. David Steele
Ethics is the secular version.
Thus morality does NOT evolve from religion.
Post by R. David Steele
Both are externally forced on you.
The hell they are.
Post by R. David Steele
A society like ours that
places the individual above all then says that what only is
important is that which the individual values, not what is best
for all.
How simply wrong.
Post by R. David Steele
Post Modernism, which is taught at most universities,
So are a lot of things.
Post by R. David Steele
says that
there is no reality except the one that you create. Thus no
external value system.
Not really.
Post by R. David Steele
Thus we are an amoral, if not immoral, society.
But we're one of the most religious countries in the west. Thanks for
making my point.
Post by R. David Steele
Which is one
reason that those in Islam, which is a heavily handed religion
far to the right of anything here in the US, hates us.
So they're very religious, and thus they are more moral than we are?
Post by R. David Steele
|>2) These folks in the 800th MP Bde are National Guard. Most of
|>them are either police officers or prison guards. One of the
|>folks facing court martial is a federal prison guard.
Were they religious?
R. David Steele
2004-05-06 04:50:27 UTC
Permalink
|>|>1) there are few people in the US who have morals and values.
|>|>Especially those from the upper East Coast. God is not high on
|>|>their list.
|>|
|>|What exactly does god have to do with morals and values?
|>
|>Morality stems from religion.
|
|The heck it does.
|
|>Ethics is the secular version.
|
|Thus morality does NOT evolve from religion.

Do not confuse morality with ethics. Morality is of a religious
nature while ethics is secular. Both are value systems.

|>Both are externally forced on you.
|
|The hell they are.

While you may accept a value system, it is given from without
you. It is a product of the community, much like norms. (Much
of this is basic sociology from your college days).

|>A society like ours that
|>places the individual above all then says that what only is
|>important is that which the individual values, not what is best
|>for all.
|
|How simply wrong.

With individualism, it is what ever is right in your eyes. The
Bible, for example, speaks of corrupt people doing whatever is
"right in their eyes" (they justified themselves by saying that
they were "moral" while doing things forbidden by God).

|>Post Modernism, which is taught at most universities,
|
|So are a lot of things.
|
|>says that
|>there is no reality except the one that you create. Thus no
|>external value system.
|
|Not really.
|
|>Thus we are an amoral, if not immoral, society.
|
|But we're one of the most religious countries in the west. Thanks for
|making my point.

And we are not very religious. Not even close to what the Middle
East or Far East are in comparison. Comparing the US to Europe
is meaningless as Europe is secular thus basically amoral.

|>Which is one
|>reason that those in Islam, which is a heavily handed religion
|>far to the right of anything here in the US, hates us.
|
|So they're very religious, and thus they are more moral than we are?

By their standards, yes.

|>|>2) These folks in the 800th MP Bde are National Guard. Most of
|>|>them are either police officers or prison guards. One of the
|>|>folks facing court martial is a federal prison guard.
|
|Were they religious?

As they were from the upper East Coast, most likely not. The
area from Boston to Washington DC is one of the least religious
portions of the US. Very secular.
Duck Dog
2004-05-06 12:00:46 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 06 May 2004 04:50:27 GMT, R. David Steele
Post by R. David Steele
|>|>1) there are few people in the US who have morals and values.
|>|>Especially those from the upper East Coast. God is not high on
|>|>their list.
|>|
|>|What exactly does god have to do with morals and values?
|>
|>Morality stems from religion.
|
|The heck it does.
|
|>Ethics is the secular version.
|
|Thus morality does NOT evolve from religion.
Do not confuse morality with ethics. Morality is of a religious
nature while ethics is secular.
Not necessarily:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/

Both are value systems.
Post by R. David Steele
|>Both are externally forced on you.
|
|The hell they are.
While you may accept a value system, it is given from without
you.
Kant showed otherwise.
Post by R. David Steele
It is a product of the community, much like norms. (Much
of this is basic sociology from your college days).
Purdue taught you this, greg?
Post by R. David Steele
|>A society like ours that
|>places the individual above all then says that what only is
|>important is that which the individual values, not what is best
|>for all.
|
|How simply wrong.
With individualism, it is what ever is right in your eyes. The
Bible, for example, speaks of corrupt people doing whatever is
"right in their eyes" (they justified themselves by saying that
they were "moral" while doing things forbidden by God).
Goody, goody for the bible. Your mistake was thinking that America is
all about individuality. It isn't. Not by a long shot.
Post by R. David Steele
|>Post Modernism, which is taught at most universities,
|
|So are a lot of things.
|
|>says that
|>there is no reality except the one that you create. Thus no
|>external value system.
|
|Not really.
|
|>Thus we are an amoral, if not immoral, society.
|
|But we're one of the most religious countries in the west. Thanks for
|making my point.
And we are not very religious.
I guess all those churches dotting the landscape, and the fact that
they are filled on Sunday morning, is just some kind of ruse?
Post by R. David Steele
Not even close to what the Middle
East or Far East are in comparison. Comparing the US to Europe
is meaningless as Europe is secular thus basically amoral.
"Meaningless"? I just said that "we're one of the most religious
countries in the west". I was right.
Post by R. David Steele
|>Which is one
|>reason that those in Islam, which is a heavily handed religion
|>far to the right of anything here in the US, hates us.
|
|So they're very religious, and thus they are more moral than we are?
By their standards, yes.
What about OUR standards?
Post by R. David Steele
|>|>2) These folks in the 800th MP Bde are National Guard. Most of
|>|>them are either police officers or prison guards. One of the
|>|>folks facing court martial is a federal prison guard.
|
|Were they religious?
As they were from the upper East Coast, most likely not.
You are so full of shit, greg. Upstate New York is full of
fundamentalist nutcakes and right wing politics.
Post by R. David Steele
The
area from Boston to Washington DC is one of the least religious
portions of the US. Very secular.
Greg, you just showed your complete and total ignorance...pretty much
like you do on all of your posts.

d***@uri.edu
2004-05-04 19:27:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Strabo
You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
blame the individuals.
The only things lacking here were morals and values.
If you left the word "only" out of this, you'd be right.
The behaviour that the MPs exhibited was imoral and
illegal, and they ought to have known that, and they
are culpable.

But:

It is *KNOWN* that if you put people in the circumstances
these MPs were put in, then they will do the sorts of things
that they did, unless some force is in place to prevent it.
That force can be either training or supervision, or, preferrably,
both.

You can claim that YOU would do better, and out of
politeness if nothing else, I'm willing to stipulate that, but
the fact that most untrained jailors and interrogators drift
towards atrocity is a well document fact of human nature.

--Goedjn
Strabo
2004-05-04 21:12:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by d***@uri.edu
Post by Strabo
You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
blame the individuals.
The only things lacking here were morals and values.
If you left the word "only" out of this, you'd be right.
The behaviour that the MPs exhibited was imoral and
illegal, and they ought to have known that, and they
are culpable.
It is *KNOWN* that if you put people in the circumstances
these MPs were put in, then they will do the sorts of things
that they did, unless some force is in place to prevent it.
That force can be either training or supervision, or, preferrably,
both.
It is known that this may happen if you put *some* people in
those circumstances.

As much as some posters want the Stanford experiment to be
a universal explanation of behavior, it is not.

Can some people be tricked, conditioned or duped into performing
the alleged acts? I think the answer is yes.

Can some people be given "permission" to rationalize fundamental
societal prohibitions against murder, assault and theft? I think
the answer is yes. In fact, military conditioning is designed to
do just that.

One of the criteria for selecting law enforcement, particularly
in the military, is the acceptance of and admiration for,
authority. Another is a moderate to high level of aggression.
This combination is necessary for police work.

But, the expected and necessary balance in the US military
is the uniquely American value of questioning authority.
Either this value is present or it isn't. If it isn't then the
rationalization, "I was only following orders.", can become the
excuse for any action.

This is why the individual actions should be judged and not allow
training or institutional considerations to cloud the issue.
Post by d***@uri.edu
You can claim that YOU would do better, and out of
politeness if nothing else, I'm willing to stipulate that, but
the fact that most untrained jailors and interrogators drift
towards atrocity is a well document fact of human nature.
That's because people who are given jobs in law enforcement and
guard work are discriminated or screened to meet certain
standards and requirements. If there had been a mixture of say,
theology students, lawyers and MPs, I'm sure events would have
been different. Torture may have still happened but it probably
would have been the theology students torturing the lawyers. :-)
Post by d***@uri.edu
--Goedjn
R. David Steele
2004-05-05 11:38:32 UTC
Permalink
|> You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
|> orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
|> that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
|> blame the individuals.
|>
|> The only things lacking here were morals and values.
|
|If you left the word "only" out of this, you'd be right.
|The behaviour that the MPs exhibited was imoral and
|illegal, and they ought to have known that, and they
|are culpable.
|
|But:
|
|It is *KNOWN* that if you put people in the circumstances
|these MPs were put in, then they will do the sorts of things
|that they did, unless some force is in place to prevent it.
|That force can be either training or supervision, or, preferrably,
|both.
|
|You can claim that YOU would do better, and out of
|politeness if nothing else, I'm willing to stipulate that, but
|the fact that most untrained jailors and interrogators drift
|towards atrocity is a well document fact of human nature.

Most of the people in the 800th MP Bde (NY National Guard) were
professional correctional officers in their full time civilian
jobs. Most worked either at State or Federal prisons. They were
that good.

However, just as doctors and nurses sometimes get complacent, the
same thing happens with those in law enforcement (which includes
correctional officers). You cut corners, bend the rules. It
happens all to frequently. It does not mean that they are not
professional or that they are not trained. It just means that
they ignore it.

You can do something too long. People need to be given breaks.
You can not go 12 hours a day, 7 days a week, for a year and not
think that people we not get complacent. And bored.
The Independent
2004-05-05 11:10:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by R. David Steele
|> You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
|> orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
|> that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
|> blame the individuals.
|>
|> The only things lacking here were morals and values.
|
|If you left the word "only" out of this, you'd be right.
|The behaviour that the MPs exhibited was imoral and
|illegal, and they ought to have known that, and they
|are culpable.
|
|
|It is *KNOWN* that if you put people in the circumstances
|these MPs were put in, then they will do the sorts of things
|that they did, unless some force is in place to prevent it.
|That force can be either training or supervision, or, preferrably,
|both.
|
|You can claim that YOU would do better, and out of
|politeness if nothing else, I'm willing to stipulate that, but
|the fact that most untrained jailors and interrogators drift
|towards atrocity is a well document fact of human nature.
Most of the people in the 800th MP Bde (NY National Guard) were
professional correctional officers in their full time civilian
jobs. Most worked either at State or Federal prisons. They were
that good.
Now I am not saying you are incorrect but correctional officers cannot
be deployed as per federal law. That is the problem with most Guard
Units as they contain a large number of non deployable personnel such
as Law enforcement Officers, Correctional Officers, Firemen, School
Teachers, other Government Employees, and Journalists.

This is why the Guard Unit may be 100% manned on the books but when they
arrive in Iraq they are at 40-60% strength as they arrive minus their
non deployable personnel.

Now you know why I have stated that the Guard and Reserve is nothing
more than a Federal Jobs Program.

The Independent

<snipped>
R. David Steele
2004-05-06 05:00:00 UTC
Permalink
|> |> You can't blame this on lack of training, or instruction, or even
|> |> orders from superiors. You can't blame this on others. Others
|> |> that for the most part will never be identified. You can only
|> |> blame the individuals.
|> |>
|> |> The only things lacking here were morals and values.
|> |
|> |If you left the word "only" out of this, you'd be right.
|> |The behaviour that the MPs exhibited was imoral and
|> |illegal, and they ought to have known that, and they
|> |are culpable.
|> |
|> |But:
|> |
|> |It is *KNOWN* that if you put people in the circumstances
|> |these MPs were put in, then they will do the sorts of things
|> |that they did, unless some force is in place to prevent it.
|> |That force can be either training or supervision, or, preferrably,
|> |both.
|> |
|> |You can claim that YOU would do better, and out of
|> |politeness if nothing else, I'm willing to stipulate that, but
|> |the fact that most untrained jailors and interrogators drift
|> |towards atrocity is a well document fact of human nature.
|>
|> Most of the people in the 800th MP Bde (NY National Guard) were
|> professional correctional officers in their full time civilian
|> jobs. Most worked either at State or Federal prisons. They were
|> that good.
|>
|
|Now I am not saying you are incorrect but correctional officers cannot
|be deployed as per federal law. That is the problem with most Guard
|Units as they contain a large number of non deployable personnel such
|as Law enforcement Officers, Correctional Officers, Firemen, School
|Teachers, other Government Employees, and Journalists.

That is not correct. I know of many in the fields you mentioned
who are deployed. I know of one NG military intelligence unit
now in Bosnia that has as its commander a person who is the
supernatant of a school system (and there are several teachers in
the unit as well). That unit also has a couple of firemen,
several police officers (to include one state cop). and two
correctional officers. The 800th MP has at least three federal
Correctional Officers that I know of. I also think that the
commander is a CO. I do not know where you got your information,
but I doubt that it is correct.

BTW, few journalists these days have ever served in the military.
It is like less than 1%.

|This is why the Guard Unit may be 100% manned on the books but when they
|arrive in Iraq they are at 40-60% strength as they arrive minus their
|non deployable personnel.
|
|Now you know why I have stated that the Guard and Reserve is nothing
|more than a Federal Jobs Program.

The reserves are far more involved than the Guard. And the Guard
is a jobs program, for the full timers. That is one of its
problems. But there is no way that we can keep the type of
talent we need on active duty. We are too many enlisted with
masters degrees or Ph.D's. And it gets worst when you are
dealing with the intelligence field or specialized Army units
such as Civil Affairs (they can take over and run a city, a state
or country and are totally in the USAR) or Psy Ops (psychology
warfare units which also are totally in the USAR).
Winston §mith
2004-05-02 03:10:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by Halcitron
(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for a
system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a crime
and why?)
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
Issue of 2004-05-10
Posted 2004-04-30
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact
caveat lector
Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
No training, no equipment, no planning, too little personnel. Typical
of this three week, on the cheap war.

And we wonder why the masses are not throwing open their arms to us.

We are on of the few nations on Earth with an all amateur government.


--
W§ mostly in m.s - http://members.1stconnect.com/anozira
Robert Sturgeon
2004-05-02 03:51:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Halcitron
(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for a
system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a crime
and why?)
Everyone involved - commanders down to enlisteds. The "I
was just following orders" defense died at Nuremburg.

--
Robert Sturgeon,
proud member of the vast right wing conspiracy
and the evil gun culture.
http://www.vistech.net/users/rsturge/
R. David Steele
2004-05-02 15:38:04 UTC
Permalink
ALCON

First off, remember to keep this apolitical. I am intending this
as chance to reflect and figure out how to do this better.

This story has been brewing. It is going to hit and hit hard.
As military professionals, we need to be aware of the story and
be able to suggest improvements to policy. My guess is that we
have had an ad hoc set of policies and structure across the
board. That was the way it was during Desert Storm. Under these
conditions, we tend to be reactive rather than proactive.

Also these folks have been in country for at least a year, or
more. People tend to get tired, to cut corners. The Navy tried
to see how long a ship and crew could go without port calls.
They lasted 181 days before crew moral dipped.

Ask yourself this: how do you plan to brief your commander on
this issue? For myself, we need to set policy and procedures even
if it means sending personnel from the MP school to Iraq to
assess the situation and take corrective measures. I have worked
with the 800 MP Bde during Desert Storm and they are very
professional. Most work in the US prison system and know how do
work in a professional manner. It is not even that they would do
something so unprofessional but that they took pictures and then
sent them to others. This is an out of control environment.

How would you do an AAR on this? What would be your suggestions
as to how do it better?

This is not the type of thing that you want to be doing in a
political year. These folks are going to get hammered, which
they deserve for being so immature. As most were professional
correctional officers in the civilian world, there have been
those who have suggested that the federal government needs to
investigate the facilities where they worked for additional
abuses (what was done is seen as prisoner abuse, not torture, and
they would have been hammered by the ACLU if this was done on a
typical prisoner in an US prison). It is also a black eye on the
National Guard, something that the Guard does not need now.

David Steele
USN, ret.

On 02 May 2004 01:10:33 GMT, ***@aol.comhatespam
(Halcitron) wrote:

|(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
|training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for a
|system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a crime
|and why?)
|
|TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
|by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
|American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
|Issue of 2004-05-10
|Posted 2004-04-30
|
|In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one
|of the world’s most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and
|vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women—no accurate
|count is possible—were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in
|twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.
|
|In the looting that followed the regime’s collapse, last April, the huge
|prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be
|removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had
|the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new
|medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the
|prisoners, however—by the fall there were several thousand, including women
|and teen-agers—were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random
|military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely
|defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of “crimes
|against the coalition”; and a small number of suspected “high-value”
|leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.
|
|Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named
|commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military
|prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone,
|was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the
|Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system.
|Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four
|hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling
|prisoners.
|
|General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a
|business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job.
|In an interview last December with the St. Petersburg Times, she said that, for
|many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, “living conditions now are better in
|prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn’t want
|to leave.”
|
|A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended,
|and a major investigation into the Army’s prison system, authorized by
|Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under
|way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by The New Yorker, written by Major
|General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in
|late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army
|prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October
|and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of “sadistic, blatant, and
|wanton criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of
|detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military
|Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community.
|(The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to
|Karpinski’s brigade headquarters.) Taguba’s report listed some of the
|wrongdoing:
|
|Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees;
|pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle
|and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police
|guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
|against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
|perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and
|intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually
|biting a detainee.
|
|
|There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba
|added—“detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic
|photographic evidence.” Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the
|abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of
|their “extremely sensitive nature.”
|
|The photographs—several of which were broadcast on CBS’s “60 Minutes 2”
|last week—show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to
|assume humiliating poses. Six suspects—Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II,
|known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner;
|Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and
|Private Jeremy Sivits—are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that
|include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners,
|maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie
|England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.
|
|The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from
|her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a
|young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he
|masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands
|reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his
|sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are
|grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked
|Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is
|another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid.
|Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in
|front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another
|cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking
|photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male
|prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear
|that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and
|hooded.
|
|Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in
|the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating
|for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of
|Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. “Being put on top
|of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each
|other—it’s all a form of torture,” Haykel said.
|
|Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There
|is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another
|prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an
|empty room, splattered with blood.
|
|The 372nd’s abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine—a fact of Army life
|that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing
|(the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant
|Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist
|Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other
|soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called “hard
|site” at Abu Ghraib—seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were
|considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting
|a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:
|
|SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think
|it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL
|Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick
|hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no
|danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.
|
|
|When he returned later, Wisdom testified:
|
|I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth
|open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn’t think it was right .
|. . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, “Look what these
|animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.” I heard PFC England
|shout out, “He’s getting hard.”
|
|
|Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that
|“the issue was taken care of.” He said, “I just didn’t want to be part
|of anything that looked criminal.”
|
|
|The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby,
|an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip
|Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of
|the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court,
|according to an abridged transcript made available to me, “The investigation
|started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across
|pictures of naked detainees.” Bobeck said that Darby had “initially put an
|anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn
|statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.”
|
|Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his
|colleagues had not been given any “training guidelines” that he was aware
|of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police
|duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003,
|the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at
|thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he
|had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of
|Corrections. Bobeck explained:
|
|What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in
|charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things
|were supposed to be run.
|
|
|Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion,
|“had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went
|into cardiac arrest.”
|
|At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys,
|Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two
|dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of
|Frederick’s co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after
|exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away
|from the courtroom. “The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage
|witnesses and discover facts,” Gary Myers told me. “We ended up with a
|c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine.” After the hearing, the
|presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to
|convene a court-martial against Frederick.
|
|Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions
|of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client’s defense will be that he
|was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions
|of military intelligence. He said, “Do you really think a group of kids from
|rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to
|embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?”
|
|In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the
|military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and
|interrogation specialists from private defense contractors, were the dominant
|force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:
|
|I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates
|in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the
|door of their cell—and the answer I got was, “This is how military
|intelligence (MI) wants it done.” . . . . MI has also instructed us to place
|a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running
|water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.
|
|
|The military-intelligence officers have “encouraged and told us, ‘Great
|job,’ they were now getting positive results and information,” Frederick
|wrote. “CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to
|intimidate prisoners at MI’s request.” At one point, Frederick told his
|family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry
|Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the
|mistreatment of prisoners. “His reply was ‘Don’t worry about it.’”
|
|In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the
|Abu Ghraib guards called “O.G.A.,” or other government agencies—that is,
|the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees—was brought to his unit for
|questioning. “They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put
|his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four
|hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a
|stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away.” The dead Iraqi was
|never entered into the prison’s inmate-control system, Frederick recounted,
|“and therefore never had a number.”
|
|Frederick’s defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in
|his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army
|reports—Taguba’s and one by the Army’s chief law-enforcement officer,
|Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.
|
|Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq
|and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder’s report, filed on November 5th,
|concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower
|issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious
|concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned
|to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate
|them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive
|collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.
|
|There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said,
|that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to “set favorable
|conditions for subsequent interviews”—a euphemism for breaking the will of
|prisoners. “Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a
|detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and
|docile state.” General Karpinski’s brigade, Ryder reported, “has not been
|directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI
|interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations.” Ryder called for
|the establishment of procedures to “define the role of military police
|soldiers . . .clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the
|military intelligence personnel.” The officers running the war in Iraq were
|put on notice.
|
|Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not
|yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he
|found “no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement
|practices.” His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a coverup.
|
|Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general.
|“Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during
|[Ryder’s] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this
|investigation,” he wrote. “In fact, many of the abuses suffered by
|detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.” The
|report continued, “Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s report, I find
|that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed
|to change facility procedures to ‘set the conditions’ for MI
|interrogations.” Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private
|contractors “actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental
|conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.”
|
|Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army
|C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s,
|testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded
|prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and
|penis. She stated, “MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and
|Frederick’s job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk.”
|
|Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told
|C.I.D. investigators, “I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . .
|being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were
|told that they had different rules.” Taguba wrote, “Davis also stated that
|he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what
|MI said he stated: ‘Loosen this guy up for us.’‘Make sure he has a bad
|night.’‘Make sure he gets the treatment.’” Military intelligence made
|these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. “The MI staffs to my
|understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like,
|‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question.
|They’re giving out good information.’”
|
|When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant
|Davis answered, “Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the
|ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the
|wing”—where the abuse took place—“belongs to MI and it appeared MI
|personnel approved of the abuse.”
|
|Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing,
|said, “I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses,
|sheets, and clothes.” (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to
|do this “they needed to give me paperwork.”) Taguba also cited an interview
|with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian
|contractor. He told of one night when a “bunch of people from MI” watched
|as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner
|and Frederick.
|
|General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers
|and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the
|commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial
|punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of
|the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and
|reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz,
|of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his
|security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or
|ordering military policemen “who were not trained in interrogation techniques
|to facilitate interrogations by ‘setting conditions’ which were neither
|authorized” nor in accordance with Army regulations. “He clearly knew his
|instructions equated to physical abuse,” Taguba wrote. He also recommended
|disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman
|for CACI said that the company had “received no formal communication” from
|the Army about the matter.)
|
|“I suspect,” Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and
|Israel “were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu
|Ghraib,” and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.
|
|
|The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior
|commanders. During Karpinski’s seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there
|were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes,
|attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by
|officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the
|killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of
|“lessons learned” inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably
|approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day
|procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to
|insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, “cases of
|abuse may have been prevented.”
|
|General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and
|that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources.
|“This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and
|accountability lapses,” he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said,
|between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially
|recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were
|wrongly being detained—indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba
|study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib
|were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be
|released. Karpinski’s defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers
|“routinely” rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such
|prisoners.
|
|Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba
|wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some
|that he considered “without precedent in my military career.” The soldiers,
|he added, were “poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at
|the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission.”
|
|General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he
|described as extremely emotional: “What I found particularly disturbing in
|her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept
|that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or
|exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish
|and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers.”
|
|Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers
|and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal
|proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and
|the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.
|
|
|After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major
|General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived
|in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay
|detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into
|possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.
|
|As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush,
|insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military
|as a whole. Taguba’s report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of
|collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels.
|The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the
|Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day
|management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units
|and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting
|intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.
|
|The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American
|intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a
|C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is
|invariably counterproductive. “They’ll tell you what you want to hear,
|truth or no truth,” Rowell said. “‘You can flog me until I tell you what
|I know you want me to say.’ You don’t get righteous information.”
|
|Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who
|pose an “imperative” security threat, but it must establish a regular
|procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat
|be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision
|and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of
|Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after
|month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect,
|another Guantánamo.
|
|As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had
|enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had
|nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and
|for the United States’ reputation in the world.
|
|Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick’s military attorney, closed his defense at
|the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was “attempting to
|have these six soldiers atone for its sins.” Similarly, Gary Myers,
|Frederick’s civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the
|court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client.
|“I’m going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian
|contractor I can find into court,” he said. “Do you really believe the Army
|relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance.”
|
|http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact
|
|
|
|
|http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact
|
|
|
|caveat lector
|
|Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
|"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
|NRA Member since 2002
|The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.
|
|Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
Halcitron
2004-05-02 23:46:30 UTC
Permalink
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
Date: Sun, 02 May 2004 15:38:04 GMT
ALCON
First off, remember to keep this apolitical. I am intending this
as chance to reflect and figure out how to do this better.
This story has been brewing. It is going to hit and hit hard.
As military professionals, we need to be aware of the story and
be able to suggest improvements to policy. My guess is that we
have had an ad hoc set of policies and structure across the
board. That was the way it was during Desert Storm. Under these
conditions, we tend to be reactive rather than proactive.
Also these folks have been in country for at least a year, or
more. People tend to get tired, to cut corners. The Navy tried
to see how long a ship and crew could go without port calls.
They lasted 181 days before crew moral dipped.
Let me see 181 days at two 12-ounce beers every 45 days, that is at least a
6-pack and maybe 8-beers per crewmember.

:)
Ask yourself this: how do you plan to brief your commander on
this issue? For myself, we need to set policy and procedures even
if it means sending personnel from the MP school to Iraq to
assess the situation and take corrective measures. I have worked
with the 800 MP Bde during Desert Storm and they are very
professional. Most work in the US prison system and know how do
work in a professional manner. It is not even that they would do
something so unprofessional but that they took pictures and then
sent them to others. This is an out of control environment.
How would you do an AAR on this? What would be your suggestions
as to how do it better?
This is not the type of thing that you want to be doing in a
political year. These folks are going to get hammered, which
they deserve for being so immature. As most were professional
correctional officers in the civilian world, there have been
those who have suggested that the federal government needs to
investigate the facilities where they worked for additional
abuses (what was done is seen as prisoner abuse, not torture, and
they would have been hammered by the ACLU if this was done on a
typical prisoner in an US prison). It is also a black eye on the
National Guard, something that the Guard does not need now.
David Steele
USN, ret.
I see a lot of assuption on the part of the planners, for not sending the
prison staff through refresher training, on the Geneva Conventions, Human
Rights, and who their Chain of command is, while in a combat theater.
I see lack of supervison/oversight and poor training.
I see a lack of process/procedure for tracking prisoners.
I see understaffing.
I see a tainted Chain of Command, in that the CIA and MI, were allowed to
direct the guards, in the treatment of prisoners.

The Stanford Prison Experiment comes to mind. http://www.prisonexp.org

I am also reminded of a recent local cop named Jeremy Morse, who lost his job
after he was taped slamming a handcuffed prisoner onto the hood of a patrol
car, then repeatedly punching the prisoner. That incedent reminded me of the
Geneva Convention, and Human Right Violations. Offcr. Morse, lost his job,
thank God.




caveat lector

Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.

Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
Strabo
2004-05-03 23:41:37 UTC
Permalink
On Sun, 02 May 2004 15:38:04 GMT, R. David Steele
Post by R. David Steele
ALCON
First off, remember to keep this apolitical. I am intending this
as chance to reflect and figure out how to do this better.
This story has been brewing. It is going to hit and hit hard.
As military professionals, we need to be aware of the story and
be able to suggest improvements to policy. My guess is that we
have had an ad hoc set of policies and structure across the
board. That was the way it was during Desert Storm. Under these
conditions, we tend to be reactive rather than proactive.
Also these folks have been in country for at least a year, or
more. People tend to get tired, to cut corners. The Navy tried
to see how long a ship and crew could go without port calls.
They lasted 181 days before crew moral dipped.
So they started beating and butt fucking each other?
Post by R. David Steele
Ask yourself this: how do you plan to brief your commander on
this issue? For myself, we need to set policy and procedures even
if it means sending personnel from the MP school to Iraq to
assess the situation and take corrective measures. I have worked
with the 800 MP Bde during Desert Storm and they are very
professional. Most work in the US prison system and know how do
work in a professional manner. It is not even that they would do
something so unprofessional but that they took pictures and then
sent them to others. This is an out of control environment.
How would you do an AAR on this? What would be your suggestions
as to how do it better?
This is not the type of thing that you want to be doing in a
political year. These folks are going to get hammered, which
they deserve for being so immature. As most were professional
correctional officers in the civilian world, there have been
those who have suggested that the federal government needs to
investigate the facilities where they worked for additional
abuses (what was done is seen as prisoner abuse, not torture, and
they would have been hammered by the ACLU if this was done on a
typical prisoner in an US prison). It is also a black eye on the
National Guard, something that the Guard does not need now.
This is a morals and values issue. It is a classic lesson in
psychology. No lack of training or leadership creates or
enables sadomasochism. The tendency is either present or it
isn't.

The federal government set the stage, chose the actors and wrote
the script. So now you want the federal government to
investigate? And take valuable time away from its ongoing
coverup?
R. David Steele
2004-05-04 04:21:09 UTC
Permalink
|>ALCON
|>
|>First off, remember to keep this apolitical. I am intending this
|>as chance to reflect and figure out how to do this better.
|>
|>This story has been brewing. It is going to hit and hit hard.
|>As military professionals, we need to be aware of the story and
|>be able to suggest improvements to policy. My guess is that we
|>have had an ad hoc set of policies and structure across the
|>board. That was the way it was during Desert Storm. Under these
|>conditions, we tend to be reactive rather than proactive.
|
|>Also these folks have been in country for at least a year, or
|>more. People tend to get tired, to cut corners. The Navy tried
|>to see how long a ship and crew could go without port calls.
|>They lasted 181 days before crew moral dipped.
|
|So they started beating and butt fucking each other?
|
|
|>Ask yourself this: how do you plan to brief your commander on
|>this issue? For myself, we need to set policy and procedures even
|>if it means sending personnel from the MP school to Iraq to
|>assess the situation and take corrective measures. I have worked
|>with the 800 MP Bde during Desert Storm and they are very
|>professional. Most work in the US prison system and know how do
|>work in a professional manner. It is not even that they would do
|>something so unprofessional but that they took pictures and then
|>sent them to others. This is an out of control environment.
|>
|>How would you do an AAR on this? What would be your suggestions
|>as to how do it better?
|>
|>This is not the type of thing that you want to be doing in a
|>political year. These folks are going to get hammered, which
|>they deserve for being so immature. As most were professional
|>correctional officers in the civilian world, there have been
|>those who have suggested that the federal government needs to
|>investigate the facilities where they worked for additional
|>abuses (what was done is seen as prisoner abuse, not torture, and
|>they would have been hammered by the ACLU if this was done on a
|>typical prisoner in an US prison). It is also a black eye on the
|>National Guard, something that the Guard does not need now.
|
|This is a morals and values issue. It is a classic lesson in
|psychology. No lack of training or leadership creates or
|enables sadomasochism. The tendency is either present or it
|isn't.
|
|The federal government set the stage, chose the actors and wrote
|the script. So now you want the federal government to
|investigate? And take valuable time away from its ongoing
|coverup?

Who ever said that the American people are moral? The average
person is into getting fat and being dumb. Few go to church.
Hell we are trying to force God out of everything. I guess this
is the end result.

However, I would point out that these folks are not typical of
the military. For one thing, this was a National Guard unit out
of the East Coast, NY and MD mostly. Higher percentage of
democrats than the normal military. And if they were typical of
most east coast types (at least those not below the Mason-Dixie
line), they tended to not be church goers.

The 800th MP Bde used to be a very professional group, even for
the National Guard.
Tim May
2004-05-04 06:39:27 UTC
Permalink
Post by R. David Steele
However, I would point out that these folks are not typical of
the military. For one thing, this was a National Guard unit out
of the East Coast, NY and MD mostly. Higher percentage of
democrats than the normal military. And if they were typical of
most east coast types (at least those not below the Mason-Dixie
line), they tended to not be church goers.
I assume you mean "Mason-Dixon," not "Mason-Dixie."

But, in fact, the torturers were NOT from NY. They were mostly from a
brigade centered in the place where Virgina, West Virgina, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania meet. John Brown was familiar with this area. And this
part of the country was most certainly not Union.

Lynndie England, for example, has a mother living in a trailer park in
West Virginia. Typical redneck trailer trash, like Jessica Lynch, who
got declared a "hero" (or "heroin") for being unconscious while her
group of clusterfucks toked their way into an Iraqi checkpoint.

All of them need to be tried, and if convicted, hanged.

Allah Aqbar.

--Tim May
Scott Stephens
2004-05-04 16:13:18 UTC
Permalink
Post by Tim May
Lynndie England, for example, has a mother living in a trailer park in
West Virginia. Typical redneck trailer trash, like Jessica Lynch, who
got declared a "hero" (or "heroin") for being unconscious while her
group of clusterfucks toked their way into an Iraqi checkpoint.
Was she the woman in the photos? I heard she had sex in front of the
prisoners with the guy, got pregnant and is back in the states.
Post by Tim May
All of them need to be tried, and if convicted, hanged.
I think it would be more just to allow some Iraqi's to force the
intelligence goons and General Janet to preform similar lewd acts, then
sell the video to compensate their Iraqi victims. Trying to humiliate
the MP's would be pointless, they'd just get off on it.
--
Scott

**********************************

DIY Piezo-Gyro, PCB Drill Bot & More Soon!

http://home.comcast.net/~scottxs/

**********************************
Scott Stephens
2004-05-02 16:34:18 UTC
Permalink
Post by Halcitron
(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for a
system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a crime
and why?)
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
As in many cases, government and corporations are institutions to evade
personal responsibility. Everyone points the finger at everyone else
while nobody is culpable. The lack of leadership, accountability and
responsibility was in the self-interest of breaking prisoners by any
means. The highest level of management is culpable for corporate
irresponsibility.
--
Scott

**********************************

DIY Piezo-Gyro, PCB Drill Bot & More Soon!

http://home.comcast.net/~scottxs/

**********************************
Halcitron
2004-05-02 23:48:18 UTC
Permalink
Newsgroups: misc.survivalism
Date: Sun, 02 May 2004 16:34:18 GMT
Post by Halcitron
(Good article, but read it through. You will see where a lack of planning,
training, supervision, and a vaccum of leadership, provide opportunity for
a
Post by Halcitron
system of abuse. Ask yourself, given the information, who is guilty of a
crime
Post by Halcitron
and why?)
TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?
As in many cases, government and corporations are institutions to evade
personal responsibility. Everyone points the finger at everyone else
while nobody is culpable. The lack of leadership, accountability and
responsibility was in the self-interest of breaking prisoners by any
means. The highest level of management is culpable for corporate
irresponsibility.
BINGO!


caveat lector

Halcitron misc.survivalism alt.survival
"Failing to prepare.... Is preparing to fail."
NRA Member since 2002
The Law of the Land, is the weapon in your hand.

Smith & Wesson starts where the Bill of Rights stop.
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